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I. INTRODUCTION

When voters in West Virginia head to the polls on election day and step
into a ballot booth, not only do they select their future legislative representatives
and executive officers, but they are also charged with the responsibility of selecting members of West Virginia's judicial branch. Sounds easy enough, right?
Wrong! This process might seem simple or flawless, but over the years, it has
drawn the attention of many critics1 who feel that the public should not be responsible for selecting the judiciary.
See, e.g., John P. Bailey, Selecting Judges, THE W. VA. LAW., Jan. 2004, at 4 (advocating
an appointment system for various reasons including: campaign finances and the selection of
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It is important to address the fear that if a few individuals select our judiciary, their decisions will be heavily influenced by politics. 2 However, a judicial branch free from all political influences is impossible to attain. The ultimate goal is to find the perfect balance. Although this is probably an unattainable goal, we must constantly strive to reach that perfect balance even with the
knowledge that in all probability we will never fully succeed. The escalating
costs of financing a judicial campaign and the perceived influences that accompany these funds have left West Virginians at a crossroads. We must take
measures to ensure that our judicial system remains fair, impartial, and balanced.
This note explores the history of some of the issues surrounding judicial
selection and examines the future of the selection process, particularly in West
Virginia. Part II of this note examines the history behind the various judicial
selection methods and how each has evolved over time. Part III provides an
overview of the three general types ofjudicial selection methods. Part IV brings
to light many of the problems, questions, and issues of judicial selection. Part V
focuses on the 2004 Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia election that
brought the judicial selection method debate in West Virginia to the forefront.
Ultimately, this note's goals are to provide the reader with a basic background
evolved and to assess the current status
of how judicial selection methods have
3
of judicial selection in West Virginia.
II.

SELECTING JUDGES: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The structures of the various judicial branches in the United States date
back to the time of the original thirteen colonies.4 Upon winning independence
from England, the early founders struggled to find a balance between an independent judiciary and a judiciary representative of the democratic principles for
female and minority candidates to fill judicial positions) [hereinafter Bailey]; ABA, JUSTICE IN
JEOPARDY:

REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON THE

2 1sT

CENTURY

JUDICIARY 1, available at http://www.manningproductions.com/ABA263/finalreport.pdf [hereinafter JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY]; W. VA. DEF. TRIAL COUNSEL, CIVIL JUSTICE COMMITTEE REPORT ON
THE STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA'S CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1, http://www.dtcwv.org/dtcwvl.pdf [here-

inafter W. VA. DEFENSE TRIAL COUNSEL]; Gina Holland, Lawyers Group Callsfor Judicial Reform, THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE, June 13, 2003, at IIA; Problems in W. Va. Legal System Must
Be Fixed Soon, THE HERALD-DISPATCH (HUNTINGTON, WV), Sept. 13, 2003, at 12A.
Larry V. Starcher, Choosing West Virginia's Judges, 20 QUINNHPIAC L. REV. 767, 774
2
(2001).

3

For a more exhaustive review of the complex landscape of judicial selection, see, e.g.,

CHARLES H. SHELDON & LINDA S. MAULE, CHOOSING JUSTICE: THE RECRUITMENT OF STATE AND
FEDERAL JUDGES 1 (1997) [hereinafter SHELDON & MAULE]; DANIEL R. PINELLO, THE IMPACT OF
JUDICIAL-SELECTION METHOD ON STATE-SUPREME-COURT POLICY: INNOVATION, REACTION, AND

ATROPHY 1 (1995); Bradley A. Smith, Symposium on Judicial Elections: Selecting Judges in the
21st Century, 30 CAP. U. L. REv. 437 (2002).
4

See generally SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 3, at 2.
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which the new nation yearned. 5 The United States federal government adopted

an appointment system to select the members of its judicial branch. To be more
precise, the President of the United States, upon approval from the Senate, appointed federal judges to their posts for lifetime tenure. 6 This federal appoint7
ment system began with the enactment of the United States Constitution.

The underlying constitutional basis for the provision establishing the judicial branch of government rests on the ideals of judicial independence and
separation of powers, as evidenced by comments made during the framing of the
United States Constitution. For example, Alexander Hamilton stated, "there is
no liberty, if the Fpower of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers." Additionally, Hamilton concluded,
If then the courts ofjustice are to be consideredas the bulwarks
of a limited constitution, againstlegislative encroachments,this
consideration will afford a strong argument for the permanent
tenure ofjudicial offices, since nothing will contribute so much

as this to that independent spirit in the judges, which must be
essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty.
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the
constitution and the rights of individuals, from the effects of

those ill-humours which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among
the people themselves, and which, though they speedily give
place to better information and more deliberate reflection, have a
tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovation in
the government,
and serious oppression of the minor party in the
9
community.

5

See generally id (discussing the experience the colonies had with colonial governors ignoring judicial rulings and creating courts just to facilitate political favors to friends and supporters).
6
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice

and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint... Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers
of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall
be established by Law.").
7
See U.S. CONST. art III, § 1 ("The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.").
8

THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).

9

Id. (emphasis added).
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That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the constitution, and of individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable
in the courts of justice, can certainly not be expected from
judges who hold their offices by a temporary commission. Peri-

odical appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever
made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to their necessary
independence. If the power of making them was committed either to the executive or the legislature, there would be danger of
an improper complaisance to the branch which possessed it: if
to both, there would be an unwillingness to hazard the displeasure of either; if to the people, or to persons chosen by them for
the special purpose, there would be too great a disposition to

consult popularity, to justify a reliance that
nothing would be
0
consulted but the constitution and the laws.'
While the exact selection method was vigorously debated at many of the
early Constitutional Convention meetings, Hamilton's comments were representative of the consensus that judges should be appointed, and enjoy lifetime
tenure in order to ensure judicial independence, a concept dear to all who had
witnessed the problems with the English monarchy system. 12 The federal selection method (appointment by the President with approval from the Senate) remains in effect today with little alteration since its inception. The various state
systems, however, have experienced a number of changes along the way.
Many of the original states allowed individual state legislatures to appoint judges, while others allowed gubernatorial appointment (with approval by
a special council to serve as a check on the governor's choices). 3 Between
1776 and 1830 each state that joined the union adopted one of the two appointment methods. 14 As Alexander Hamilton and other Federalists began to see
their political philosophy overtaken by that of Jeffersonian democrats, the Jacksonian period began, "emphasizing representative bodies and citizen participation." 15 Feeling that numerous courts had used judicial independence to take
10

Id. (emphasis added).

11

SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 3, at 9-11.

12

See generally id.at 1-2.
Id. at 3. Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South

13

Carolina, and Virginia all used legislative appointment, while judges in Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New York, and Pennsylvania were chosen by each state's governor. Id.
14
Id. Alabama, Illinois, Mississippi, Ohio, and Tennessee followed the legislative approach
and Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, and Vermont all employed gubernatorial

appointment. id.
15

Id. (citing JAMES WILLARD HuRST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS

140 (1950)).
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policy making out of the hands of legislators, some states began shortening juditerms and selecting judges through popular election, as corrective devices. 16

cial

These popular elections soon turned into partisan battles with heavy influence from political sectors.17 Many of the corruptive vices of politics began
to creep into the judicial branch, causing a wave of reform beginning around
1913. Two main reform methods rose to the forefront: nonpartisan elections
and what came to be known as the Missouri-plan. 19 All of the previously mentioned methods for selecting judges have survived in some form or another in
various states. For example, as examined in Part III.A, West Virginia is one of
only six states still using partisan elections to select the judges for its highest
court and one of only eight states that selects its trial court judges by partisan
2
election. 0
III.
A.

OVERVIEW OF THE VARIOUS METHODS OF SELECTING JUDGES

West Virginia'sMethod: PartisanElections
The constitution of West Virginia specifically outlines the powers of

West Virginia's judicial branch. 21 The selection of the various levels of West
Virginia's judicial branch is done by election, as described in the state constitution. 22 More specifically, the constitution states that the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia "shall consist of five justices .... The justices shall be
elected by the voters of the State for a term of twelve years, unless sooner re-

moved or retired as authorized in this article.

'23

Circuit court judges and magis-

trates are selected in largely the same fashion. 24 While the constitution provides

general guidelines and minimum requirements that individuals must meet before
16

Id. at 4. In 1846, just over half of the 29 states used popular election and all states entering

after 1846 adopted this method to some degree. Id. The states that resisted the move towards
popular election chose to shorten judicial terms to maintain control of their judiciary. Id.
17

Id. at5.

18

Id.

19

Id. at 5-6; (discussed infra Parts II.B & III.C respectively).

20

ABA, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: FACT SHEET ON JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS IN THE STATES,

at http://www.manningproductions.com/ABA263/FactSheet.htm
21
See generally W. VA. CONST. art. VIII.

(last visited Oct. 27, 2003).

22

Id.

23

Id. §2.

24

W. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 5 (stating that "[tihe judge or judges of each circuit court shall be

elected by the voters of the circuit for a term of eight years, unless sooner removed or retried as
authorized in this article.); W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 10 (stating that "[t]he legislature shall establish in each county a magistrate court ....
The legislature shall determine the qualifications
and the number of magistrates for each such court to be elected by the voters of the county .... ").

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2004

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 107, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 10
[Vol. 107

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

being qualified to serve in any of the state's judicial capacities, the voters of the
state still ultimately determine who will serve as their judges. 25 Thus, depending on the judicial position (ranging from magistrate to state supreme court justice), the voting population locks the judiciary into place for anywhere from four
26
to twelve years.
Partisan elections have always been a hotly debated topic, especially

within the legal community. Opponents of partisan judicial elections cite the
appearance of impropriety, lack of the appearance of judicial independence, and
campaign financing among the many problems that arise when popular vote is
used to select judges.

Problems with judicial elections as well as problems

under other judicial selection methods will be discussed infra, but first it is necmethods used by other states:
essary to examine the alternative
2

nonpartisan

elections and merit selection.

The NonpartisanElection

B.

Despite language in the West Virginia constitution allowing for nonpartisan judicial elections,

partisan elections are used to select West Virginia's

judiciary.
Many states, however, use a system of nonpartisan elections to select
30
judges.

The movement away from partisan elections and towards nonpartisan
elections began in the late nineteenth century when politics was seen as "all but

VIII, § 7.

25

W. VA. CoNST. art.

26

W. VA. CODE § 3-1-16 (2002) (regarding terms for state supreme court elections and stat-

ing: "At the general election to be held in the year one thousand nine hundred sixty-eight, and in
every twelfth year thereafter, there shall be elected one judge of the supreme court of appeals, and
at the general election to be held in the year one thousand nine hundred seventy-two, and in every
twelfth year thereafter, two judges of the supreme court of appeals, and at the general election to
be held in the year one thousand nine hundred seventy-six, and in every twelfth year thereafter,
two judges of the supreme court of appeals.); W. VA. CODE § 3-1-17 (2002) (regarding terms for
circuit judges and magistrates and stating: "There shall be elected, at the general election to be
held in the year one thousand nine hundred ninety-two, and in every eighth year thereafter, one
judge of the circuit court of every judicial circuit... ; and at the general election to be held in the
year one thousand nine hundred ninety-two, and in every fourth year thereafter,... the number of
magistrates prescribed by law for the county ...").
27
Potential problems with judicial elections discussed infra Part IV.A.
28

See infra Parts III.B and III.C respectively.

29

W.VA. CONsT. art. VIII, §§ 2, 5, 10.

30

See Bailey, supra note 1, at 5 (listing Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Michigan, Min-

nesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Washington,
and Wisconsin as states using a non-partisan election to select judges). See also ABA, JUSTICE IN
JEOPARDY:

FACT

SHEET

ON

JUDICIAL

SELECTION

METHODS

IN

THE

STATES,

at

http://www.manningproductions.com/ABA263/FactSheet.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2004).
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destroy[ing] the integrity of the bench. ' 31 In fact, the following comment became indicative of the attitude towards partisan elections by many in the legal
community:
[A] party judiciary becomes an evil intolerable to be borne ....
The second great evil of the partisan selection of judges ... is
Day by day, year afthe corporate influence in the courts ....

ter year, here a little and there a little, these soulless and breathless creations of the genius of modem enterprise are extending
their influence, their demands and their greed. They never die;
they never tire; they never sleep. [Finally], the manner in which
a political nomination convention... is organized makes it impossible to secure decent judicial nominations. 32
Therefore, with fears of judicial corruption and corporate influence on the judiciary among other considerations, nonpartisan elections were seen "as a means
the judiciary)] without
for involving voters directly in the government [(namely
33
being distracted by parties and special interests."
Many variations of nonpartisan systems are used today by individual
states.34 Some states hold judicial elections at times separate from other partisan elections in an effort to remove political influences from judicial races.35
Other states merely remove the party affiliations of judges from ballots. 36 Regardless of the exact method by which nonpartisan elections are conducted,
many of the elections still experience political influence whether it be in the
form of campaign contributions or public endorsements of certain "nonpartisan"
candidates by political groups. 37 This begs the question: can an election truly
be "nonpartisan?" Some states have answered this question with an emphatic
"no" leading to an approach to judicial selection that more closely resembles the
federal method.

31

SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 3, at 43 (stating that "[p]olitical pay-offs and cronyism
often had more to do with being nominated subsequently elected judge than qualifications").
Often, party loyalty meant one would be selected to run for a judicial position and "j]udgeships
sometimes became the dumping ground for political 'has-beens."' Id.
Id. at 43-44 (citing a quote contained in CHARLES H. SHELDON, A CENTURY OF JUDGING: A
32
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT 61 (1988)).

33

Id. at 44.

34

See generally, e.g., SHELDON & MAULE, supranote 3.

35
36

Id. at 45.
Id.

37

Id.
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Merit Selection: The Missouri-Plan

C.

A "compromise" arose out of the struggle to find a method for selecting
judges that would provide an independent judiciary without the perils accompanying popular elections while simultaneously involving the public in the process. The process to find this "compromise" first originated in 1906 when a
young law professor told the American Bar Association "popular judicial elections were a major cause of public dissatisfaction with the administration of
justice." 38 Former United States President William Howard Taft agreed when,
in 1913, he "declared that even the nonpartisan judicial ballot was a failure...
[because] such a system permitted unqualified persons who were incapable even
of political support to become elected through a vigorous campaign." 39 These
views coupled with others led to the establishment of the American Judicature
Society ("AJS"). 40 This society sought to establish a merit selection system
"that would maximize the benefits and
41 minimize the weaknesses of both the
appointment and election processes."
The system that the AJS came up with has long been referred to as the
"Missouri-Plan" because, after being approved by the American Bar Association
in 1937, Missouri was the first state to accept this selection method.42 The Missouri-Plan consists of three primary components: (1) a "non-partisan nominating commission of lawyers and non-lawyers to identify and evaluate candidates
for judicial positions"; (2) an "appointing authority (usually the governor), who
chooses [which candidates] to appoint to the bench"; and (3) "retention" votes
which allow the general public to participate in nonpartisan, noncompetitive
elections to evaluate a judge's record during his tenure.
While the details of the various merit selection systems vary, the basic
premise is as follows: First, a nominating commission is chosen. 44 These individuals, usually consisting of both legal professionals and others, collaborate
and decide on a list of potential candidates to fill judicial vacancies. 45 Then,
38

ALLAN ASHMAN & JAMES J. ALFINI, THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, THE KEY TO

JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: THE NOMINATING PROCESS 10 (1974) (relaying the sentiments of
Roscoe E. Pound, University of Nebraska, law professor regarding the popular election of judges)
[hereinafter ASHMAN & ALFfNi].
39
Id. at 10-11.
40

Id.at 11.

41
42

Id.
Id.

43

Tillman J. Finley, Note, JudicialSelection in Alaska: Justificationsand Proposed Courses

of Reforn, 20 ALASKA L. REV. 49, 52 (2003) [hereinafter Finley].
4

See generally,e.g., ASHVAN & ALFINI, supra note 38; Finley, supra note 43, at 52.

45

Id.
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after narrowing down the candidates, the nominating commission presents its
choices to the appointing authority. 46 The appointing authority is usually the
governor or another member of the executive branch, but can in some instances
be the state's legislative body.4 7 Finally, the chosen judge serves a specific term
before coming under voter review. 48 At this point, the voters get to decide
whether the nominating commission and appointing authority have made the
correct decision in appointing the particular judge
S 49 by voting either to retain the
nominee.
new
a
with
judge
the
replace
judge or
Although this "compromise" sounds like a way to keep everyone involved in the judicial selection process while ensuring a qualified, independent
judiciary, it has seen its share of problems just as the popular election methods
50
have.
IV. JUDICIAL SELECTION: No STRANGER TO CRITICISM

ProblemsArising Under an Election System

A.

1.

Actual and Perceived Impropriety

Judges are viewed as the voice of reason and fairness in our society, the
ones who are able to put aside their personal beliefs in order to decide difficult
questions with the utmost degree of impartiality and integrity. At first glance, it
may seem easy for judges to put everything else aside and decide cases on the
merits alone, but this process is more complicated. Regardless of how hard a
judge may try to suppress emotions and decide a case based on the law only,
sometimes it is difficult. Therefore, in an effort to provide judges with some
assistance and guidelines on how to perform their duties, the American Bar Association issues a Model Code of Judicial Conduct ('Model Code").5 1 The
Model Code is broken down into the following five basic canons, which all
judges should tailor their behavior towards:
(1) A judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the
judiciary;
(2) A judge shall avoid impropriety in all of the judge's activities;
(3) A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially and diligently;
46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Id.

49

Id.

so

See infra Part IV.B (discussing problems under merit systems).

51

ABA, MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2000).
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(4) A judge shall so conduct the judge's extra-judicial activities
as to minimize the risk of conflict with judicial obligations; and
(5) A judge or judicial
candidate shall refrain from inappropri52
activity.
political
ate
Canon Two53 plays a prominent role in the context of judicial elections.
Judicial candidates who might succumb to the pressure and act in a manner that
would bring the judge's integrity into question are certainly not our first choice
for the bench. For example, would we select a judge who knowingly used his
54
position in the judiciary to attempt to avoid prosecution for a traffic violation?
No, this type of actual impropriety, while arguably insignificant, is certainly
unacceptable. However, the question becomes much more blurred when looking at instances where there is only a mere appearance of impropriety.
"The test for the appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct
would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge's ability to carry
out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality, and competence is impaired." 5 5 Combine this test with an impending judicial election and many difficulties arise: public perception and campaign contributions being just two
such examples.
Allegations of judicial impropriety,
•
• 56regardless
... of whether the allegations hold any truth, affect public perception. For instance, imagine a situation
in which a judge is presiding over a case involving a group of retirees alleging
improper denial of pension benefits by their former employer, a large international corporation. If the judge crafts a ruling favoring the retirees will he lose
campaign funding from the corporate sector? What if the judge sides with the
company, does the judge lose valuable votes with those individuals of retirement
age in the community? These thoughts should not be a factor in the judge's
decision, and most likely are not a factor. However, the suspicion or appearance
of impropriety, especially if the ruling is controversial, can warp the public's
perception of the judge and the judicial system as a whole.
These are the types of unfortunate situations that popular judicial elections can breed. Abandoning judicial elections certainly would not eliminate all
instances of actual or perceived impropriety, but it would reduce the possibility.
Anything that can be done to reassure the public that "judges are fair and keep
52

Id.

53

Id.

("A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the

judge's activities.").
54

See id. at 6 (providing useful commentary containing examples of acts that would constitute

actual judicial impropriety).
55

Id. (contained in the commentary related to Canon 2A).

56

Kara Baker, Comment, Is Justice ForSale in Ohio? An Examination of Ohio JudicialElec-

tions and Suggestions for Reform Focusing on the 2000 Race for the Ohio Supreme Court, 35
AKRONL. REv. 159, 170 (2001).
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the justice system functioning effectively"57 is worth trying. Additionally, if
"[t]he Framers of the Constitution considered impartiality and its apearance to
be essential enough to remove the judiciary from popular elections,
states that
have not done so should consider doing the same.
2.

Campaign Speech

Another area that gives rise to conflict in judicial elections is the campaign speech of candidates for the judiciary. While "[t]he role that elected officials play in our society makes it all the more imperative that they be allowed
freely to express themselves on matters of current public importance," 59 it is the
opinion of many of those in the legal realm that "' [i]t is the business of judges to
be indifferent to popularity,' 60 and that "[t]heir mission is to decide 'individual
cases and controversies' on individual records.' 61 The basic feeling among
many in the legal profession is that candidates for judicial office 62
should not be
issues.
legal
disputed
on
opinions
personal
their
discuss
to
allowed
Members of the United States Supreme Court, in a five to four vote,63
used a strict scmtin), analysis to reject restrictions on judicial speech during judicial campaigns.
The Court determined that Minnesota's "announce
clause" 6 5 violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution because
it wasasserted
not narrowly
tailoredthat
to the
serve
a compelling
state
interest. 66 The
respondents
two interests
Court
failed to see
as compelling:
(1)
57

Id. at 174.

58

Id. at 169.

59

Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 395 (1962).

60
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 401 n. 29 (1991) (quoting Stevens, The Office of an Office, CHICAGO BAR RECORD 276 (1974).
61
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 804 (2002) (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter,
Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (citing Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 266 (1995) (Stevens,

J., dissenting)).
62

See Baker, supra note 46, at 176 n. 130; see also, ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Canon 5(C)(2) cmt. (2000) (stating: "[M]erit selection of judges is a preferable manner in which
to select the judiciary." This is exemplary of the ABA's general attitude disfavoring judicial
elections for numerous reasons including campaign speech.)
63
See Republican Partyof Minn., 536 U.S. at 788-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
64

Id. at 765.

For a general overview and discussion of the case, see Gaston de los Reyes,

Student Note, Appearance of Impartiality in the Republican Party v. White Court's Opinion, 83
B.U. L. REv. 465 (2003).
65
Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 768 (citing MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,

Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000) ("'candidate for a judicial office, including an incumbent judge,' shall
not 'announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues."')).
66

Id. at 788.
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"preserving the impartiality of the state judiciary," and (2) "preserving the appearance of the impartiality of the state judiciary." 67 The court suggested many
reasons why impartiality (or the appearance of impartiality) was not a compeldoes not restrict speech for or
ling state interest, including: (1) "the clause
68
against particular issues;"
or
for
speech
rather
but
parties,
against particular
(2) the impossibility of finding judges who do not have preconceptions about the
law (due to the wealth of legal experience that should have been enjoyed by any
qualified applicant for a judicial post);69 and (3) "the announce clause still fails
strict scrutiny because it is woefully underinclusive, prohibiting announcements
by judges (and would-be judges) only at certain times and in certain forms." 70 7
Although some limits on campaign speech are perhaps permissible,
the ruling in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White 72 certainly makes it much
more difficult to impair the speech of judicial candidates. The majority admitted that "[t]here is an obvious tension between the article of Minnesota's popularly approved Constitution, which provides that judges shall be elected, and the
Minnesota Supreme Court's announce clause which places most subjects of
interest to the voters off limits." 73 The Supreme Court of Minnesota believed
that the current judicial election system warranted some change to ensure judicial impartiality in enacting the "announce clause."
However, now that the United States Supreme Court has declared the
clause unconstitutional Minnesota is left with the same concerns as before with
little or no help. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion suggests that perhaps
the only solution is for Minnesota to abandon its current judicial election system
when she states,
Minnesota has chosen to select its judges through contested
popular elections instead of through an appointment system or a
combined appointment and retention election system along the
lines of the Missouri Plan. In doing so the State has voluntarily
taken on the risks to judicial bias described above. As a result,
67

Id. at 775.

Id. at 776 (stating: "[t]o be sure, when a case arises that turns on a legal issue on which the
judge (as a candidate) had taken a particular stand, the party taking the opposite stand is likely to
lose. But not because of any bias against that party, or favoritism toward the other party. Any
party taking that position is just as likely to lose. The judge is applying the law (as he sees it)
evenhandedly."). Id at 776-77.
Id. at 777-78.
69
68

70

Id. at 783.

Id. at 780 (suggesting that Minnesota's separate limit on what the Court referred to as a
"prohibition on campaign 'pledges or promises,"' is perhaps constitutional).
71

72

Id. at 765.

73

Id. at 787.
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the State's claim that it needs to significantly restrict judges'
speech in order to protect judicial impartiality is particularly
troubling. If the State has a problem with judicial impartiality, it
is largely one the State brought upon
itself by continuing the
74
practice of popularly electing judges.
These struggles over judicial campaign speech further justify why many states
have switched to at least a partial appointment system for selecting judges.
3.

Perception of Voter Ignorance and Disinterest

What do voters think about when they go to the polls to select their
elected officials? Just which races warrant the attention of the voting public?
Can voters adequately assess the competency and other qualifications of judicial
candidates to the degree necessary to select the right person for the job? These
and other questions lead to yet another difficulty encountered all too often in
judicial elections: the perception of voter ignorance and disinterest. Voters are
often overwhelmed by the majority of information available about potential
candidates for political office. When election time rolls around, it seems as if
you cannot pick up a newspaper, open the mailbox, or turn on the radio or television without being bombarded with political advertisements endorsing candidates.
Conversely, voters have not traditionally been bombarded with political
messages in judicial elections because of restrictions placed on judicial campaign speech. As a result, many voters "go to their polling place without having
assimilated much (or any) information about these [judicial] contests." 75 A lack
of information about judicial candidates can lead to the casting of votes for reasons entirely unrelated to a judicial candidate's qualifications. For example,
"Kansas and West Virginia provide the candidates' cities or counties of residence" on ballots which can lead to what is known as "friends and neighbors"
voting resulting in candidates fairing much better at polling places near their
homes. 76 "Rolloff' is also fairly common in judicial elections. 77 This phenomenon occurs when voters abstain from voting for any candidate because of
78
lack of information.

74

Id. at 792 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

Lawrence Baum, JudicialElections and JudicialIndependence: The Voter's Perspective,
64 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 19 (2003), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/lawjournal/baum.htm [hereinafter BAUM].
75

76

Id.at 21-23.

77

Id. at 19.

78

Id.
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Yet another trend that occurs when voters have a lack of information
about a candidate is voting along party lines. In fact, most individuals tend to
identify with one of the two major parties, 79 and it has been suggested that "[a]s
the volume of other information declines, party identification is likely to become
increasingly important as a basis for choices between candidates."0 Therefore,
it is not all that uncommon for a voter to choose a far less qualified candidate in
favor of one that belongs to the political party that a particular voter supports.
After the decision in Republican Partyof Minnesota v. White more information about judicial candidates is likely to become available to voters. This
decision will no doubt lead to more information getting into the hands of the
voting public, but the question is, what kind of information? Will judges merely
state their qualifications and political beliefs, or will they go as far as simply
running ad campaigns to achieve a higher degree of name recognition or perhaps
campaigns attacking the "qualifications or off-the-bench behavior" of their
competitors? 82 It is uncertain, but the decision in Republican Party of Minnesota83 seems likely to "increase the frequency with which candidates state explicitly how they stand on issues" thereby "facilitat[ing] issue-based attacks on
incumbents by challengers. '' 84 For example, "creating the impression that a
judge is soft on crime can have great electoral impact.' 85 This motive is often
achieved (as was done in California in 1986) 86 by demonstrating an incumbent
' 87
What may rejudge's unwillingness "to impose or uphold death sentences.
in
qualifications
meager
with
a
judge
into"
electing
"talked
voters
being
sult is
who
individual
qualified
highly
and
competent
a
highly
court
of
order to rid the
is simply more lenient when it comes to imposing the death penalty. One may
not wholly disagree with this result, but if the court deals only with a few capital
cases per year while it hears thousands of medical malpractice disputes, what
good does having a less qualified judge who favors the death penalty really do
Id. at 24 (citing as support for this proposition HAROLD W. STANLEY & RICHARD G. NIEN,
VITAL STATISTICS ON AM. POL. 2001-2002, at 114 (2001)).
80
Id. (citing Barbara Hinckley et al., Information and the Vote: A Comparative Election
79

Study, 2 AM. POL. Q. 131, 143-45 (1974); Stephen D. Shaffer, Voting in FourElective Offices: A
ComparativeAnalysis, 10 AM. POL. Q. 5, 13-19 (1982)).
81

Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002); (discussed supraPart IV.A.2).

82

BAUM, supra note 67, at 34.

83

Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. 765.

84

BAUM, supra note 67, at 34.

85

Id. at 35.

86

Id (citing as support for this proposition John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of the

CaliforniaJustices: The Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue of JudicialAccountability, 70
JUDICATURE 348, 353-54 (1987)).
Id.
87
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for the public? These are examples of the kinds of troubling issues that voter
ignorance and disinterest raise and ones that could be somewhat alleviated with
the abandonment of popular judicial elections.
4.

The Financing Behind Judicial Campaigns

Campaign finance is continually a hot topic in the political realm.
Members of Congress, presidential candidates, and others with political aspirations fight the constant battle over ethical financing of political campaigns.
How much money should a candidate raise in order to run a successful campaign? Should there be a limit on campaign spending, and if so, what should
that limit be? Who can contribute to a candidate's campaign, and how much?
These are among the many questions that arise when discussing campaign finance. Unfortunately, the judicial branch of our government is no stranger to
these same concerns when it comes to judicial elections. In fact, opponents of
as the major reason
judicial elections cite the financing of judicial campaigns
88
that a change in selection method is urgently necessary.
Judicial candidates typically raise campaign funds in a slightly different
fashion than other political candidates due to the need for separation from their
contributors. For example, the ABA has suggested the following general limitation on judicial candidates dealing with campaign financing:
A candidate shall not personally solicit or accept campaign contributions or personally solicit publicly stated support. A candidate may, however, establish committees of responsible persons
to conduct campaigns for the candidate through media advertisements, brochures, mailings, candidate forums and other
means not prohibited by law. Such committees may solicit and
accept reasonable campaign contributions, manage the expenditure of funds for the candidate's campaign and obtain public
statements of support for his or her candidacy. Such committees are not prohibited from soliciting and accepting reasonable
campaign contributions and public support from lawyers. A
candidate's committees may solicit contributions and public
support for the candidate's campaign no earlier than [one year]
before an election and no later than [90] days after the last election in which the candidate participates during the election year.
A candidate shall not use or permit the use of campaign89contributions for the private benefit of the candidate or others.
88

See, e.g., W. VA. DEF. TRIAL COUNSEL, supra note 1, at 19-21; Bailey, supra note 1, at 4;
Gina Holland, Lawyers Group Calls for Judicial Reform, THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE, June 13,
2003, at I1A.
89

ABA, MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(C)(2) (2000) (citation omitted).
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This provision keeps judicial candidates from directly soliciting funds,
but the harsh reality is that judicial candidates still receive massive amounts of
campaign contributions, a phenomenon which can lead to the appearance of
impropriety. Figures indicate that the cost of judicial campaigns is rising dramatically.9 0 For example, the ABA found that in Pennsylvania, "two candidates
for a [s]upreme [c]ourt seat in 1987 raised a total of $523,00 [sic] between
them," but "by 1995, that figure [had increased] to $2.8 million." 9 1 This increase pales in comparison to the figures the ABA discovered in Ohio, which
saw an increase from $100,000 to $2.7 million for a single supreme court seat
over the six-year period from 1980 to 1986. 92 These figures are indicative of
judicial elections throughout the United States. In fact, one report indicates that
"[d]uring the 2000 election cycle, more than a million dollars was spent on supreme court races in each of nine states, including[:] Alabama, Illinois, Michi93
gan, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, and West Virginia."
However, the real problem with "big money" being spent on judicial elections is
not the sheer amount of funds being expended, but the sources of these funds.
One of the ABA's major concerns with judicial elections is that judges
accept funds from contributors who may appear before them or who may have
an interest in a case that is before a particular judge. 94 The fact that judicial
candidates are spending millions of dollars to finance their campaigns is one
thing, but when big businesses, special interest groups, and attorneys play a role
in the financing of judicial campaigns, many critics begin to take notice and
express concern. An example uncovered during an ABA investigation indicated
that an Alabama Justice raised $35,000 from the Business Council of Alabama,
$10,000 from the Alabama Forestry Association, $5,000 from political action
committees, and $5,000 from insurance lobbyists. 95 Receiving campaign financing in these amounts from such special interest and politically grounded
groups can easily lead the public to question a judicial candidate's impartiality.
Think about this situation: a judge receives a large percentage of campaign
funds from labor unions, and subsequently rules against large corporations in
several cases involving employment issues. This scenario could certainly lead
to the perception (thus the appearance of impropriety and impartiality) that the
judge is finding ways to protect campaign interests and supporters.

See generally ABA, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL
CAMPAIGNS 9 (2002).
91
Id. at 10-11.
90

92

Id. at 10.

93

JUSTICE INJEOPARDY, supra note 1, at 22.

94

ABA, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS

11

(2002).

95

Id. at 12.
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Another major concern regarding the financing of judicial election campaigns involves contributions from attorneys. The ABA studied contribution
levels to high court races between 1989 and 2000 and was able to trace 76% of
the total contributions to an original source. 96 Of these contributions, 29% came
from attorneys. 97 The main concern with attorney contributions to judicial campaigns is the public's perception that the contributions might, in some way, influence a judge who may have to decide a case that involves one of his contributors. Of course, contribution limits are placed on the amount a judge can receive
from any one attorney 98 and campaign fundraising committees 99 attempt to isolate judges from the fundraising efforts, but, nevertheless, the appearance of
possible impropriety still exists in the eyes of the public.
West Virginia has seen its share of attorney contributions to judicial
campaigns throughout the years. Of the five-justice panel that comprises the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, four of the justices have received
100
the largest amount of their campaign funding from personal injury attorneys.
In fact, it is reported that contributions from personal injury law firms (which
are in no way equal to the total amount of contributions made by attorneys) have
among the five current justices, totaled over a half million dolin the aggregate,
10 1
lars.
The amount of money flowing into judicial campaigns often leads to the
perception that judicial decisions are being influenced. For example, a survey in
Texas revealed that "83% of Texas adults, 69% of court personnel, and 79% of
Texas attorneys believed that campaign contributions influenced judicial decisions 'very significantly' or 'fairly significantly,' while 48% of judges indicated
that money had an impact on judicial decisions." 102 The Defense Trial Counsel
96

JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 1, at 24.

97

Id.

98

See generally ABA, MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(C)(2)-(3) (2000). The
commentary following Canon 5(C)(2) expressly mentions that merit selection is favored over
popular election of judges for the simple reason that attorney contributions to judicial campaigns
raise issues of impartiality, especially when the judge has knowledge of the contributions and
when the contributions "by virtue of their size or source, raise questions about a judge's impartiality." Id. The comment goes on to note that these types of situations can be grounds for disqualification. Id.
99

Id.

100

Statistics available at http://www.wvjusticewatch.org/money/index.html (last visited July 5,

2004). In campaigns from 1996-2000, the lowest percentage that any justice received in terms of
campaign contributions from personal injury attorneys was 20% (Justice Spike Maynard in 1996)
and the largest was 78% (Justice Warren McGraw in 1998 and Justice Joe Albright in 2000). If
Justice Maynard's 20% figure is excluded the average percentage of judicial campaign funds
coming from personal injury attorneys in elections for the Supreme Court of Appeals of West

Virginia is 71%. Id.
101

id.

102

John P. Bailey, supra note 1 at 4 (citing a survey sponsored by the Texas Supreme Court).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2004

17

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 107, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 10
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107

of West Virginia ("DTC WV") conducted a similar survey, questioning attorneys
103
in West Virginia about their views of the judicial system in West Virginia.
Although the DTCWV survey only questioned a small number of defense attorneys, the results clearly show that the attorneys were uncomfortable with many
104
facets of West Virginia's judicial system and its method for selecting judges.
The fact that any number of attorneys and judges feel that judicial campaign
contributions have an effect on judicial decisions raises a red flag. If judges are
unable to separate their campaigns from their business in the courtroom, then is
it not about time to find a better way to select our judiciary?
B.

Problems Arising Under Appointment Based Systems

1.

The Few Making Decisions for the Many

States that utilize either pure judicial appointment (similar to the Federal
appointment process) or some form of merit selection process (such as the Missouri-Plan) to choose the judiciary branch rel on a small number of individuals
Proponents of these selection
to select candidates for judicial positions.
methods often cite the ability to avoid voter ignorance and disinterest, the ability
to select a more qualified judiciary, and the removal of "big money" from the
judicial selection process as reasoning for their support.l16 However, opponents
view elections as the key to keeping the public involved in the judiciary. The
Honorable Larry V. Starcher, Justice on the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia, contends, "the competitive election process results in just as able or
'qualified' a judiciary as the appointment process."' 107 He further states it is his
experience that
it is widely found that there are substantial social and political
virtues associated with the competitive election of judges.
These virtues include the accountability, independence, legitimacy of the judicial branch of government, and the selection of
persons as judges who are involved in and attuned to their
communities. A competitively elected judiciary has been said

103

W. VA. DEF. TRIAL COUNSEL, supra note 1, at 89-98.

104

Id. For example, many of the attorneys surveyed felt that West Virginia's courts (in particu-

lar the Supreme Court of Appeals) did not always decide cases in a fair and objective manner and
that some judges were often disrespectful to attorneys during oral arguments. Id.
105 See generally SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 3, at 105-46.
106

See generally JUSTICE INJEOPARDY, supra note 1, at 24-26.

107 Starcher, supra note 2, at 768-69.
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in a more well-rounded, responsive, and enlightened
to result
10 8
bench.
Justice Starcher makes a valid point when he argues that removing poli-

tics altogether from judicial elections would be "unrealistic."10° 9 The main point
of his argument can be summed up in the following statement: "[T]he selection
of judges always has been and always will be political .... [T]he issue is what
sort of politics will be involved in the judicial selection process? The politics of
the few or the politics of the many?" 10 Starcher' s point is essentially one of
letting the people who might come in front of the judge decide who the judge
will be rather than allowing a few elite lawyers or politicians decide for the people.
Justice Starcher attempts to redefine the word "qualified" as it relates to
judicial candidates. His version of "qualified" is a candidate who has suffered
through the trials and tribulations of the campaign trail in his local community
rather than a well-established defense attorney that is being groomed for the
bench. 1 1' Adopting Starcher's argument, the question still remains whether
popular elections actually serve to ensure that the most "qualified" candidates
become judges. With the influence of campaign financers such as big corporations and attorneys, can elections take place that ensure that the most qualified
candidate is selected, or are the voters merely selecting the most "qualified"
politician, or neither? Justice Starcher argues, "campaign finance committees
insulate judicial candidates from fundraising" and that "the issues of campaign
costs and financing are distinct and different from the issue of judicial selection
methods."1 1 2 Many others take an alternate view and almost concede that elections would serve as an acceptable method for selecting judges, absent the campaign financing issues that arise.113 Thus far, West Virginia has yet to act and
has left the selection of judges in the hands of its voters, but for how long this
will continue is unknown, especially considering the growing concern regarding
judicial campaign financing.

108

Id. at 769-70 (footnotes omitted).

109

Id at 773.

tl0

Id. at 774.

HI

See generally id at 775-77.

112

Id. at 775.

113 See Gina Holland, Lawyers Group Callsfor Judicial Reform, THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE,
June 13, 2003, at I IA; Problems in W. Va. Legal System Must Be Fixed Soon, THE HERALDDISPATCH (Huntington, WV), Sept. 13, 2003, at 12A.
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Judicial Accountability and Misconduct

As discussed supra in Part II, pure judicial appointment has long been
the judicial selection method of choice for the Federal government. However,
lifetime tenure tends to raise concerns about how a judge would ever be removed from the bench if it became necessary. The solution advocated at the
federal level is impeachment, 114 but this process has been heavily criticized for
(1) being a "cumbersome and time-consuming process,"' 115 (2) only being used
"in cases of egregious judicial misconduct,"' 116 and (3) being an "'all-ornothing' solution to the problem of judicial misconduct." 117 In response to critics of the federal appointment system and in an effort to reach a compromise,
supporters of appointment-based judicial selection often suggest that if lifetime
tenure is the reason for holding onto the idea of electing judges, then merit selection is the proper approach.
The argument for merit selection is essentially that many of the improprieties accompanying partisan judicial elections are eliminated, and the lack of
judicial accountability is remedied by allowing retention election voters to vote
against judges accused of judicial misconduct. On the surface this seems like a
compromise that might solve the perceived lack of judicial accountability that
arises when judges are appointed. However, studies have shown that in retention elections it is almost impossible to remove an incumbent judge. 118 One
study, covering retention elections in ten states from 1964-1994, found that 99%
of all incumbent judges are successful in reelection bids in retention elections. 119 This appears to be in part due to the lack of a physical opponent in
retention elections, where judicial incumbents only face opposition in the form
of negative ad campaigns from "bar associations, citizen groups, or newspa114

U.S. CONsT. art. 11, § 4.

Alex B. Long, "Stop Me Before I Vote For This Judge Again": Judicial Conduct Organizations, JudicialAccountability, and the Discipliningof ElectedJudges, 106 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 17
(2003) (citing Warren S. Grimes, Hundred-Ton-Gun Control: Preserving Impeachment as the
Exclusive Removal Mechanismfor FederalJudges, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1209, 1210 (1991)).
116
Id. In support of his statement, Professor Long cites authority supporting the fact that
115

"[o]nly thirteen federal judges have been impeached by the House of Representatives in the nation's history, and only seven of those were convicted by the Senate." Id He goes on to say that
"[flive of these convictions came in the twentieth century, and the judges in each instance were
charged with offenses that, if committed, would have constituted crimes." Id.
117
Id.
11

See BAUM, supra note 67, at 28 (citing Larry Aspin et al., Thirty Years of JudicialRetention

Elections: An Update, 37 Soc. Sci. J. 1, 8-12 (2000)).
119 See id. (citing Larry Aspin et al., Thirty Years ofJudicialRetention Elections: An Update,
37 Soc. Sci. J. 1, 8-12 (2000)). The article goes on to state that "[a]bout half of the defeats occurred in one state, Illinois, and all but one of the Illinois defeats resulted from the state's unique
requirement of a 60% affirmative vote for retention." Id.
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pers." 120 In fact, numbers indicate that only 13% of judicial incumbents in retention elections even bothered formally campaigning to retain their spot on the
bench. 12 1 It is important to note that the study ended in 1994, so there is a pos-

sibility that judicial incumbents122in retention elections face more opposition and
are removed more often today.

V. WEST VIRGINIA'S STRUGGLES WITH JUDICIAL SELECTION: THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS ELECTION

2004

* Author's Note.- Neither this section nor any other part of this Note is in any
way an effort to criticize West Virginia's currentjudiciary or any of its decisions. This Note merely suggests that ifpopularelections continue as West Virginia'sjudicial selection method, the integrity of ourjudiciary as we know it is
in seriousjeopardy of being undermined.

West Virginia has chosen to use partisan elections to select the judges

who will serve on its highest court.' 23 The West Virginia constitution states that
the five justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia "shall be
elected by the voters of the State for a term of twelve years, unless sooner re-

moved or retired. . .,,124 In 2004, West Virginia's voting public will be called
upon to choose someone to sit on the bench until 2016 (barring removal, retirement, etc.). Current Supreme Court of Appeals Justice Warren McGraw's seat

is up for grabs, and although he is running for reelection, he is not without opposition, both in the form of other candidates and in the form of political enemies. 125 Justice McGraw has been characterized in the media as pro-plaintiff,
insensitive to the needs of businesses, and adored by trial lawyers.'
120

Many,

Id. at 29 (citing Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Campaigningfor Retention in Illinois,

80 JUDICATURE 84 (1996); Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention Elections and Judicial
Behavior, 77 JUDICATURE 306, 308 (1994).
121
See id. According to the retention election survey, 13% becomes 2% if Illinois, with its
60% affirmative vote requirement for retention, is excluded. Id.
122 See generally id. at 13 (citing, e.g., William Glaberson, Fierce Campaigns Signal a New
Erafor State Courts, N.Y. TIMEs, June 5, 2000, at Al, for the proposition that judicial campaigns
are becoming much more highly contested, and also to point out that interest groups have begun to
take a more serious interest in the outcome of state judicial elections).
123 See generally W. VA. CONST. art. VIII.
124

Id. § 2.

125

See Lawrence Messina, Supreme Court Race Could Be Hardest Fought, THE COARLESTON

GAZETTE, Aug. 4, 2003, at C1 (discussing the anticipation regarding the 2004 race for the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia paying particular attention to political struggles surrounding the court and possible opponents to the incumbent Justice Warren McGraw).
126 See generally id; Robert Lenzner and Matthew Miller, Buying Justice, FORBES, July 21,
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including Justice McGraw himself, give these allegations little if any merit, but
many groups are paying close attention to the race for Justice McGraw's seat on
the court. In fact, the United States Chamber of Commerce has spent over 100
million dollars supporting the campaigns of judicial candidates since 2000, and
is now reportedly willing to contribute to a campaign opposing Justice
McGraw's reelection bid. 27 Reports allege that the "prime objective" of the
Chamber is "to vote out judges supported by trial lawyers, labor unions and the
Democratic Party and install new judges sympathetic to insurance companies,
multinational corporations and the Republican Party." 128 This "secret war on
judges ' 129 is particularly troubling because it brings politics to the forefront of
the one branch of government that should be free from political influence.
Further evidence of politics invading the judiciary exists in press releases from various labor organizations announcing Justice McGraw as the candidate of choice in 2004.130 The argument has become so heated that lawyers
have organized to formally examine the civil justice system, 13 1 and a current
member of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has come out publicly
32
in support of retaining elections as West Virginia's judicial selection method.1
In addition, the Honorable John McCuskey, a former member of the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia, publicly stated that the Court is the "key in
133
determining West Virginia's economic future."'
In fact, the debate over judicial selection in West Virginia has escalated
to the point that the West Virginia State Bar has highlighted judicial selection
reform as an item on its agenda for change in the state.
The immediate past
president of the West Virginia State Bar, John P. Bailey, characterized the 2004
election as follows, "I predict that the present supreme court election will con2003, at 64, 66-67.
127
Lenzner & Miller, supra note 126, at 64-65.
128

Id.

129

Id.

130
See Business Briefs: AFL-CIO Endorses McGraw for Court, THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE,
Nov. 4, 2003, at DI (reporting West Virginia's largest labor union's endorsement of Warren
McGraw); UMW Endorses McGrawfor Court, CHARLESTON DAiLY MAIL, OCt. 18, 2003, at 5C.
131
W. VA. DFR TRIAL COUNSEL, supra note 1; Juliet A. Terry, New State Bar PresidentFavors Appointing Judges, STATE J., July 11, 2003, at 22, available at http://www.statejournal.com;

Gina Holland, Lawyers Group Calls for Judicial Reform, THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE, June 13,

2003, at 11A.
132

Larry V. Starcher, Editorial, Choosing Judges: Elections Will Result in QualifiedJudiciary,

THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE, June 9, 2003, at 5A.
133
See generally George Hohmann, Supreme Court Seen as Key to State's Economic Future,
FormerJustice Says Court Can Undo Reforms, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Aug. 12, 2003, at C 1.
134
See John P. Bailey, Remarks at the 2004 Annual Meeting, THE W. VA. LAW., Apr. 2004, at
4; Charles M. Love, III, Acceptance Speech, THE W. VA. LAW., May 2004, at 4.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol107/iss1/10

22

Anderson: Judicial Elections in West Virginia: By the People, for the Peopl
2004]

JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN WEST VIRGINIA

clude with the largest amount of money ever being spent in a judicial race and
the hardest campaign ever waged. It will undoubtedly leave a bad taste in the
mouths of citizens throughout the State." 135 The current president of the West
Virginia State Bar, Charles M. Love, III, stated,
I firmly believe that when we get through the primary and general election process this year for the position on the West Virginia Supreme Court, there will be a consensus of lawyers,
judges and the general public [sic][,] [t]hat in order to enhance
respect for the judiciary and our justice system, we need to
make changes in our judicial selection process.136
Love has even established a West Virginia State Bar committee to investigate
the manner in which West Virginia selects its judiciary. 137 The fact that the last
two presidents of the West Virginia State Bar feel that West Virginia's judicial
system is in need of image enhancement to increase respect is alarming. West
Virginia needs to take this debate out of the newspapers and put it before the
legislature so that a change can begin.
successful during the May
Justice McGraw
.. was
. ..
. .2004
138 primary election
Much was writin his bid for reelection, winning the democratic nomination.
ten about the heated battle between McGraw and his main opponent Jim
Rowe, 139 as well as the amount of money spent on the race, in the days following the primary election. 14 Since then, West Virginia's struggle with judicial
campaigns has only intensified. 4 ' November's general election has seen an allout-war between Justice McGraw and his republican opponent Brent Benja135

Bailey, supra note 134, at 4.

136 Love, supra note 134, at 4.
137

Charles M. Love, II, Board of Governors at Work, TIrE W. VA. LAw., Aug. 2004, at 4
(listing the chair and members of the newly formed committee). The committee will officially
begin meeting following November's general election. Id.
138
Chris Wctterich, Supreme Court: McGraw Overcomes Negative Ads to Defeat Rowe, THE
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, May 12, 2004, at Al. With special interest groups spending $1.6 million
on the primary election and $1.4 million being spent by the two main democratic candidates, this
was the most expensive judicial election race in West Virginia history. Toby Coleman, Court
Race AttractedBig Money: The $3 Million Spent on McGraw-Rowe Match Made it the Priciest
Court Primaryin State History, CHARLESTON DAILY MALt, July, 21, 2004, at A 1.
139

Wetterich, supra note 128, at Al. Jim Rowe has served as a judge in the Circuit Court of

Greenbrier County, West Virginia since 1997. Id.
140

See, e.g., id; Coleman, supra note 128; and Chris Wetterich, Campaign 2004: McGraw

Wins Battle, but Business War Rages, THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE, May 13, 2004, at C1.
141

See e.g., Brad McElhinny, High Court Ad War Intensifies, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Octo-

her 22, 2004, at IA; Paul J. Nyden, Massey CEO's Political Donations Questioned, THE
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, October 21, 2004, at IC.
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min.142 For example, advertisements, while not always endorsed by the opposing candidate, have become so controversial that the West Virginia State Bar
actually asked the candidates to "tone it down." 143 The downside to this type of
campaign is that the victorious candidate's judicial tenure may be tainted by
questions regarding his integrity, which should never be the case.
In conclusion, efforts to improve the system are far more useful and
worthwhile than mud-slinging and public insults, which have no place in our
judiciary. Regardless of who's side you take, the ultimate point is this: West
Virginia needs to take a long, hard look at its method of selecting judges to ensure the most qualifiedjudiciaryis chosen in our state.
VI. CONCLUSION
Taking into account the recent publicity surrounding West Virginia's
judicial election process, including public struggles over our judicial selection
method 144 and the increasing role that finances are playing in judicial selection, 145 reform is inevitable. As this Note discusses, every type of judicial selection method has its problems, but the most disturbing and prevalent problem in
West Virginia today is the financing of judicial campaigns and the appearance
of impropriety that accompanies it. West Virginia must change its judicial selection process before the public loses faith in West Virginia's judiciary.
The question now becomes what should West Virginia do? There is no
one right answer and the decision is not an easy one, but it is a decision that
must be made and soon. There are many possible reforms that West Virginia
could make to its judicial selection process that would help curb the appearance
of impropriety associated with the large contributions being made to judicial
campaigns. For example, West Virginia might go to a pure appointment system
or a merit-based system to select its judges, approaches advocated by defense
46
lawyers in West Virginia, the American Bar Association, and legal scholars.'
Another option is to keep an election system, but use campaign finance reform
to help alleviate the large amounts of money exchanging hands in judicial elec142
143

See id.
State Bar Urges Cleaner Supreme Court Race: Benjamin Attack Ads Fueling 'Nastiest'

Contest in the Nation, Group Says, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL,October 19, 2004, at 5A.
144
Compare Larry V. Starcher, Editorial, ChoosingJudges: Elections Will Result in Qualified
Judiciary, THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE, June 9, 2003, at 5A, and Larry L. Rowe, West Virginia
Judicial Selection Process: "Merit" in the Eye of the Beholden Versus Election FinancialReform, THE W. VA. LAW., December 2003, at 14, with W. VA. DEF. TRIAL COUNSEL, supra note 1,
and Juliet A. Terry, New State Bar President Favors Appointing Judges, THE STATE JOURNAL,
July 11, 2003, at 22, available at http://www.statejournal.com, and Gina Holland, Lawyers Group
Callsfor JudicialReform, THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE, June 13, 2003, at 1LA.
145

See supra Part IV.A.4.

See generally W. VA. DEF. TRIAL COUNSEL, supra note I; JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note
1; Larry L. Rowe, supra note 144, at 14.
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tions. Perhaps West Virginia could set strict limits on the amount legal professionals and corporations can contribute to judicial campaigns, or even develop a
system to publicly finance judicial elections. Everyone seems to have an opinion about what the proper method is for selecting West Virginia's judges, so
why not let the legislature hear the arguments and decide what is best for the
people of West Virginia?
An examination of these various alternatives warrants a great deal of
discussion and further study, thereby removing it from the scope of this note,

but West Virginia has to seriously consider taking the steps necessary to conduct
this examination.

If our state continues to stand still and take a stubborn ap-

proach to the hotly debated topic of judicial selection, eventually West Virginia
may come to the point where labor unions, public interest groups, political lobbying organizations, and large corporations will cause the bidding war for

judges to escalate to a point where the voice of voters will be virtually eliminated. Is it better to let elected officials appoint judges instead of allowing the
almighty dollar to control our judicial branch? That is the question that the

elected representatives of the West Virginia Legislature must address unless
West Virginia intends to allow its judges to become the servants of a few power-

ful groups rather than the servants of justice for all West Virginians.
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